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ABSTRACT
"Local Consequences of Reclama tion Overkill"

A nine-year intermittent study of promotion grouf records,

planning and operational documents, plus dozens of conversations

with "watermen" familiar with the Weber Basin Project, Utah, ha s

led us to conclude that considerable mis-allocation of scarce re-

sources has occurred.

Expensive, planned reclamation featureq have

been a complete failure ; a great regional imb alance in benefi ts and

costs exists; development of a continuously recharged under gro und

aquifer could have been made at a fraction of the surface fea t ure

cost.

The fact that the project is in no financial diff iculty is

beside the point, the truth is that a lot of unnecessary costs must

still be borne by someone.

This situation is the direct result of

the actions of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation and Utah water de-

velopment leaders.
,I

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to a persistently promoted idea, not all parts of the

West live under the imminent threat of water shortage.

Utah's

Weber Basin is a striking example of overreaction to the generally

arid conditions of the intermountain region.

It is so well endowed

with dams, reservoirs, diversion and treatment facilities that they

are a financial, political, administrative and economic embarrassment.

The most recent, and largest, accretion of such works is the

Weber Basin Project (WBP) built by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation

in the 1950's and 1960's; it is this project that is at the root of

the embarrassment.

Facilities of the WBP are operated by the Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD) which also acts as a col-

lection agent for the Bureau.

Residents of the Basin are committed

to pay for construction costs of the WBP and the Conservancy Dis-

,i

trict is an agency of state government with power both to tax and

to make contracts with the Federal government.

Except for the

southern portion of Davis County, the Basin was generally well

2

endowed with irrigation and municipal water works before the WBP

was built.

As a consequence, construction of the WBP and subsequent

management of the facilities is marked by a number of ironies:

extraordinary benefits are concentrated in one part of the Basin

while the repayment burden is concentrated on a quite different

section; the additional water supplies could have been provided, as

needed, at much lower cost through alternative means; a

great deal

more water was developed than is used; a key element : n the deci-

sion to build the whole project was desire for more irrigation

water in one limited area of the Basin; and even before construction

was completed;, certain facilities

\~ere

being duplicated by cities

and towns within the project service area.

These observations are "the outcome of an intensive examination

over several years, of published and unpublished documents of the

Bureau of Reclamation, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District,

Office of Utah State Engineer, Utah Division of Natura.l Resources,

correspondence, and minutes of promotional groups, plu.s the solicited
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testimony of persons intimate with the history and affairs of the

WBP and WBWCD.

The map (Fi.gure 1) shows principal features of the WBP, which

included new dams or enlargements, new aqueducts, and interconnec-

tions with the extensive water control system already in place be-

fore the WBP was initiated.

Scattered, small

locations planned

for supplemental irrigation service in mountain valleys are not

shown on the map.

It's main purpose is to provide some geographi--

cal references and contrast the already irrigated area with those

proposed for the main region:

foothills east of Great Salt Lake

and lowlands adjacent to the lake itself.

In addition, a project

objective was provision of some water for municipal and industrial

(M&I) purposes that is treated in WBWCD plants.

Referring to the map, the only part of the propoEied irrigation

area over which a real concern for more irrigation water was evident

in pre-project days, was the high bench lands of South Davis County.

This is the lower third of the foothills area on the map from

,
t.l

Fig . 1.
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Farmington south.

But it was also clear, almost from the start,

that the cost of a high line aqueduct system for a part of Davis

County would be very high relative to potential irrigation benefits

and repayment capacity.

other features:

That fact appears to have called forth the

calculated benefits to irrigation were extended by

addition of the reclamation component (represented by the extensive

lake plain area), and repayment capacity was jacked up by a plan to

sell high-priced municipal and industrial water.

The reclamation

features were a high proportion of the total cost of the project,

but have never been used.

Except for initial contracts, M&I water

has encountered stiff sales resistance.

FAILURE OF THE RECLAMATION PHASE

The Weber River drains a larger watershed than does the Ogden,

and is also more fully used to irrigate patches of land along its

upper courses.

The Ogden serves only one valley before reaching the

East Shore area, whereas the Weber and t'ributaries serve five major

and several smaller developments above the mouth of Weber Canyon.

6

By means of the old Davis and Weber Canal, a major portion of the

lands in Northwestern Davis County and southwest of Ogden City are

also served by prior rights to the Weber Rive r.

So a:re lands under

the new Davis and Weber aqueducts, built as part of the WBP.

Lands

in the Hooper area and others to the north can be supplied from the

Ogden River or the combined Ogden and Weber.

Some lands in Box

Elder County and those North and East of Ogden City receive water

from the Ogden River Project constructed in the 1940's.

They are

the only good lands of the East Shore area that could be served

more efficiently by the Ogden than by the Weber.

The Ogden or the combined Weber-Ogden could water poorer lands

or the lower delta (lake plain), but this had never been done be-

cause such lands require extensive rehabilitation by drainage and

leaching.

The relatively under-used Ogden therefore represented a

means whereby these low lands could be reclaimed.

Proposed WBP

facilities were designed to exploit this reclamation possibility

and lead to greater equity in relative use of the two rivers.

7

In the form that won congressional approval, the WBP plan re-

port identified about 218,000 acres of potential lands in the proj-

ect area and proposed to provide full or supplemental irrigation to

about 113,000 acres or slightly over half the total.

Of the latter,

almost half (48,300 acres) were lake plain lands to be serviced by

the proposed Willard and Layton canals linked to the Ogden River

source.

When 23,000 acres situated in high valleys are also sub-

tracted, only 41,200 acres actually lie along the high er benches

of the East Shore and less than 16,000 comprise the So uth Davis

area mentioned.

Proposed average annual project water supply was similarly

divided:

16,000 acre feet to the mountain valleys, 82,000 acre

feet to the Lake Plains and 80,100 acre feet to the foothills area.

Constructed conveyance capacity is considerably less than this.

As a consequence, there is no existing way of delivering water from

WBP reservoirs to most of the intended reclamation lands.

The WBP,

therefore, has not augmented Ogden River use very much, while use

8

of the Weber has definitely increased.

At the same time, almost

all the planned storage capacity has been built--the result is a

big divergence between supplies and deliveries.

Willard Reservoir is the most obviously redundant feature of

the WBP because everyone can see that there is no place for the

water to go.

Originally the idea was for water in the reservoir to

be pumped backwards in the Willard Canal, to reach reclaimed lands

of the lake plains.

But these lands have not been drained, and the

Layton Canal was not completed.

Water from Pineview Reservoir was

also destined for the lake plains lands, without any need for pump-

ing, via the diversion at Slaterville and the Layton Canal

schematic, Figure 2).

(see

As it is, there is also no place for Pineview

storage to go except down the Ogden River into Great Salt Lake or

over into Willard Reservoir.

In short, despite all the economic forecasting that preceeded
"

actual construction and after spending enormous sums to put the

water in place, the Bureau discovered that reclamation farming had

virtually no appeal.
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STORAGE CAPACITY, CONVEYANCE CAPACITY AND REDUNDANCY

Overcapacity in the system is fairly obvious to residents of

the Basin who are interested enough to take a look around Willard

Reservoir.

Nevertheless, it is not simple to discern the full ex-

tent and location of redundancy from official reports.

This and

the next section, including Table 1 and the schematic diagram, are

an exposition of detective work in documents published by the Bureau

and the WBWCD.

The schematic diagram (Figure 2) locates both Pineview and

Willard reservoirs on the Ogden system.

These are thl= storage

facilities that make the active storage figure for thl= Ogden system

in Table 1 so large.

When this amount (256,000 a.f.) is compared

to planned delivery capacity, the ratio is much larger than for the

Weber side.

In fact the constructed capacity on the Weber system

is roughly the same as planned so that the ratio of constructed de-

livery capacity to active storage only moved from 1:1.14 to 1:1.2,
whereas on the Ogden side the ratio fell from 1:2.8 to 1:10.0 as a

Table 1.

Planned and constructed capacities and sales of WBP water (1974, in acre feet)

Weber System

Active
storage
Capacity

Delivery
(1959
DPR*)

99,000

86,700

82,325

9,600
77,100

Upper valleys
East Shore Foothills
Ogden System

256,000

Upper Valleys
East Shore Foothills
Lake Plains
(Layton Block)
(Willard-Warren Block)
TOTAL Project
*DPR

=

Definite Plan Report.

355,000

Under
Unit
Notice
1974

Sold
1974

Available
for sale
1974

81,449

76,199.2

5,249.8

8,800
73,525

7,800
73,649

7,407.2
68,792

392.8
4,857

91,500

25,605

18,965

14,989.6

3,975.4

6,400
3,000
82,100
(39,100)
(43,000)

6,900
4,705
14,000
(6,000)
(8,000)

7,900
4,705
6,360
(700)
(5,660)

7,289.5
4,705
2,995.1

6l0.5

178,200

Capaci~

Constructed

107,980

100,414

(2,995.1)

3,364.9
(700.0)
(2,664.9)

91,188.8

9,225.2

~
~

12
result of conveyance facility

cutbacks.

Except for a little over

2,000 a.f. increase in constructed facilities for the Upper Valleys

and the East Shore Foothills, all the delivery capacity cutbacks on

the Ogden side are accounted for, as expected, in the Lake Plains

figures.

Even if the lake plains had been reclaimed as intended, the

water storage developed to serve them was 2.8 times their estimated

maximUI1l requirement (compare this to 1.4 on the Weber side).

Further--

more, there is little prospect of ever using the whole excess since

the region is becoming more and more urban, and urban land use takes

less water per acre than .agricultural use.

Delivery capacity is really conveyance capacity; that is what

controls the size of the operation.

Bureau repayment requirements

are based on unit notices issued and these in turn are based on

delivery capacity.

(By means of unit notices the Bureau tells the

Conservancy District what water is available and must be paid for.)

From the standpoint of "system size" therefore, in 1974, the Bureau

13

and the WBWCD could say that the delivery contracts C3ales) as a
percentage of "capacity" looked pretty good (about 91 :7.: ).

This

reportorial tactic helps mask the ex tent of storage redundancy.

OVER CAPACITY AND UNIT NOTICES

There is gross over capacity in the Ogden

Weber is running about as planned.

system~

while the

The Pineview storage capacity,

which cost a little over one-half as much to develop as that of

Wanship is hardly used and the Willard Reservoir capacity currently

estimated at about 170,000 acre feet "active" is not used for irri-

gation at all.

A glance at Table 1 will confirm that in 1974 only

about 5,000 a.f. under unit notice was unsold on the \lTeber side,

and this is gradually being taken up in "class D" cont.racts to

residential users who pay an above average irrigation water price.

However, since Table 1 also shows there is only about 4,000 acre

feet in the Ogden system under unit notice and unsold, it is neces-

sary to make inferences about some missing figures.
Table 1 shows constructed capacity in the lake plains blocks
to be 14,000 a.f. in contrast to 1959 plans for 82,100 a.f.

This

14

means that only enough conveyance facilities have bee-Ll built to

handle 14,000 a.f. in a season.

In contrast to this constructed

capacity, the unit notice is for 6,360 a.f.

Actual remunerative,

consumptive use out of Willard Reservoir for all purposes appears

to be less than 5,000 a.f. per year.1

In spite of these figures,

gleaned from its own publications, Bureau spokesmen were clai ming

in 1972 that only 56,500 a.f. in Willard sub-system water was re-

garded as "not under unit notice."

But a footnote to one of their

tables mentions an additional 56,500 a.f. "available for all

purposes."

When asked why the reported supply is so low i n comparison to

Willard Reservoir capacity, Bureau spokesmen have said that it is

due to "exchanges with other parts of the system."

According to a

1975 newspaper article it appears that 44,000 a.f. in Willard
Reservoir are being reserved for "exchanges" in event of a drought

year.2

This would be accomplished by pumping Willard water back up

the canal to serve fanners in Plain City , West Warren and Hooper,

15
areas which are entitled to upstream (Weber River) water.

TIleir

entitlement, in turn, can be delivered to other water-short areas

higher up along the Weber.

Such an eventuality is remote because

the areas mentioned could be served by any available Ogden River

flow plus any unused storage in Pineview, even if there were not

a trickle left in the Weber by the time it reached the Slaterville

Diversion.

That is, Pineview could handle the imagined drought,

with no help from Willard.

In effect, very little of the Pineview and

Willa:~d

water is

under unit notice and therefore it is not being directly paid for.

The cost of this excess capacity is simply covered indirectly by

the U. S. public in general picking up a la.rger share of the tab

and by local citizens bearing the remainder.

REDUNDANCY AND PROJECT OPERATION

The WBWCD Annual Report for 1974 registered a supply of

115,000 a.f., disposed of as follows:
M & I replacement

2,615 a.f.

16
M & I Wasatch Front

29,498 a.f.

Irrigation, operational
spills and losses

83,119 a.f.

Figure 2 presents a disaggregation of these totals.

The breakdown

was achieved by inference after careful comparisons among District

and Bureau documents.

The reward for making the disaggregation is

the discovery of a likely reason for making the location of water

deliveries

so obscure in the official reports.

Following are some

notes to assist readers with the schematic, beginning along the top,

with sources.

The number of acre feet in the case of the reservoirs is for

"active" storage.

Active storage is the amount that can actually

be delivered from a reservoir, if full. 3

By Bureau f:igures, the

sum for East Canyon, Lost Creek, and Wanship is 99,000 a.f.

To

this we add their estimate of 4,212 a.f. from small Wasatch Front

streams and nearly 10,000 a.f. from wells.

a.f. available from the Weber side alone.

This maken about 113,000

Comparable figures for

the Ogden side are 72,000 a.f. (not including Willard Reservoir).

17

The combined total shows an average storage potential of consider-

ably more than the 115,232 acre feet reported delivered in the
1974 Report.

Since we are treating the active storage as a flow

the difference shows up in the form of "residuals" in the Weber

River~

Willard Canal and possibly the lower Ogden River.

Rec-

tangular areas in Figure 2 mark the various destinations of the

waters shifted and controlled by the WBWCD.

On

the Ogden side, Causey storage is used to capacity above

Pineview, via Eden Canal.
out of Pineview storage.

Less than 15,000 a.f. is actually sold
Ogden City pays for 10,000 a.f. of M &

I per year, but would never get over 1,500 a.f. of the total from
Pineview (actually only 10 a.f. in 1974)

because most of it comes

from the Weber system via the Weber Aquaduct.
the Layton Canal.

Nothing flows in

About 6,000 a.f. of irrigation water is sold in

Box Elder County and in mountain valleys, and the bulk of about
7,500 a.f. of M & I water deliveries by Willard Canal is sold to two
users.

Therefore, we may estimate the average Pineview "residual"

18

going unwa nted and unused i nto Willard Reservoir or Gr eat Salt

Lake at a bout 51,000 a.f. per year.

On t h e Weber system, in the same fashion, some wa ter is di-

v erted to mountain valleys, but the bulk of delievered WBP water

passes through the Gateway Tunnel, and is then transported by

aqueduct to the destinations shown.

Some of these can be separated,

and others (enclosed by dashed lines) are simply the general totals

received by groups of users.

For e x ample, about 8,773 a.f. of M &

I water was deliVeries by the Davis and Weber aqueduc t s to all the

towns shown in such groups.

The total sales o f water to each town

(a contracted amount, regardless of a.ctual use) are g1 ven in paren-

thesis under the names.

Since the sales of M & I water in Davis

County plus Roy and "other Weber" total about 18,975

deliveries

H.

f., any

that cannot be made from the Davis aqueduct must (by

inference) come from the wells drilled by the WBWCD for this very

purpose.

Irrigation sales listed for the various blocks are more than

enough to require all of the 48,961 a.f. "residual" s own even
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without allowance for all the spills and losses of the whole proj-

ect.

That is, irrigation sales in the Davis Aqueduct region are

great enough to require all the residual slack in the entire con-

structed system.

Since even a small amount of water eannot be put

into any aqueduct over a period of time unless it is removed, and

since the Gateway tunnel is used to virtual capacity during the

irrigation season,4

we can draw two significant inferences:

a.) some WBP water may go down the Weber River channel direct to

Great Salt Lake, but this on average (with full releaEie of active

project storage) could hardly be over 16,000 a.f.; b) there is no

way both irrigation and M & I commitment can be met from the Davis

Aqueduct system; supplemental wells are necessary and always ha.ve

been!

This latter point merits further emphasis:

to mE:et the WBWCD

commitment for irrigation, the Davis Aquaduct must be full all

summer.

During that busy time of year, some under ground water

to cover municipal and industrial sal-es is essential.

(Actual

well capacity of approximately 34,000 a.f. is considerably higher

20

than the amount pumped in 1974.)

To put it another

,yay, the 1959

Definite Plan Report required M & I sales of 50,000 a . f. by 1975,

to meet repayment obligations.

Without ground water development

this objective could not have been realized, for aqueduct capacity

is insufficient.

This fact is so inconsistent with the overwhelming

e.mphasis placed on surface water development during planning and

construction that it may account for the obscurity with which physi-

cal water movements are now treated in management repc1rts. It would

be difficult to imagine a stranger administrative embarrasment than

the existence of redundant surface features in one part of the proj-

ect service area combined with the necessity for supplemental wells

in another.

MUNICIPALITIES AND GROUND WATER DEVELOPMENT

The wells that provide part of WBP water in the Davis Aqueduct

service area signify more than underdesign of the adqu.educt.

It is

or has been less expensive for towns to construct and operate wells

than to pay the $43 per a.f. conservancy district price for M & I

21

'vater.

Ground water has proved abundant and easy to develop.

In

1959 prices, the entire volume of current WBP deliveries in the
East Shore area could have been provided from wells

cost of under $2 million.

a "~

a capi.tal

(Only 60-70,000 a.f. of neH" irriga.tion

water have been sold from WBP facilities, and this amount could

have been obtained from 16-18 wells in addition to those already

supplying M & I water.)

Capital cost of the large surface system,

by contrast, was close to $100 million.

Wells must be pumped of course, and this makes cost compari-

sons more difficult.

However, many town managers interviewed used

to calculate operation and amortization costs of their own wells

at about $12 per a.f.

By 1975, total costs of a well-·water supply

equivalent to the WBP (wells, conveyance, treatment and pumping

installations) would have amounted to $20 to $30 million.

Further-

more, most of that cost would have been current charges (for pump-

ing) so that no interest payments would have been involved.
The first big wells for the WBP M & I component were constructed

in the northwest Davis County by the Bureau of Reclamation, which

22

had been studying ground water potentials of the East Shore with

the U. S. Geological Survey.

When town managers saw how effective

this program was, they forgot about further contracts for District

water and started to develop wells of their own.

The WBWCD tried

to prevent them by asserting jurisdiction over all wa t ers of the

region not appropriated prior to construction of the WBP.

water managers were enraged.

Local

Water from the WBWCD CO :3t them over

$40 per a.f., well water about $12.

Adding insult to injury, the

high-priced Conservancy District water often came from WBP wells

just outside their own town boundaries.

Towns appealed to the State

Engineer's Office, which rejected the District's claim.

This decision of the early 1950's was a blow to t he District

and the Bureau.

The price of M & I water had been se t high enough

to subsidize the irrigation features of the project.

Without mono-

poly control over M & I supplies there was a potential threat to

revenue expectations.

Ever since the Boulder Canyon Project

(Hoover Dam), hydroelectric and municipal-industrial sales ha.ve

been openly referred to as the "paying partners" of reclamation.

23
1be formula ran into trouble in the Weber Basin becaune obvious

abundance of water made contrived scarcity a very dif f icult idea

to sell.

Towns have simply been duplicating Conservancy District

M & I facilities to a greater or lesser degree for the past 20 years.

DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS AND INCIDENCE OF COSTS

With the understanding that irrigation use is subsidized by

urban residents and industrial users, it is instructive to notice

how the two kinds of WBP water are distributed geographically.

already shown, little

ir~igation

As

water is sold in parts of the East

Shore area that could be served from the Ogden River.

Northwest

Davis County generally continues to rely on traditional, mutual

irrigation company supplies.

But the towns in this region, in com-

bination with Ogden City, have contracted over 61% of the WBWCD's
total M & I sales.

Central and South Davis County, on t he other

hand, take the lion's share of the subsidized irrigation water from

the WBP, but pay for only 20% of the expensive M & I water.

Over

40% of all irrigation water goes to South Davis (Bountiful-Woods

24

Cross area).

Urban residents in and around Bountiful enjoy a

separate, piped-in irrigation system, under pressure, built and
pumped by the WBWCD at subsidized prices, yet Bountiful City pays
for only 1,000 a.f. of WBP M & I water.

Figure 2 illustrates

these points.
This does not end the list of ironies which surround water

management in the Weber Basin.

It is probably sufficient to arouse

some curiosity for an explanation, nonetheless, and w(? now address

ourselves to the question of how the WBP got that way.

BASIN-WIDE SOLUTION OF A SOUTH DAVIS PROBLEM
Although the Weber Basin generally is reasonably well-endowed
with water and storage-conveyance facilities, the southern portion
of Davis County seemed to be an exception, and by the late 1940's,
local farmers and watermen were convinced that their own irrigation

resources were fully exploited and that future development depended
on getting an augmented supply from the Weber River.

They put in
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an application to the State Water and Power Board for assistance,

were turned down, and took their case to the Bureau o f Reclamation.

The Bureau went to work immediately.

They already had plans

on the shelf for a much more comprehensive development than the

s torage and aqueduct wanted in South Davis.

In addit i on to the

understandable possibility that a group of engineers preferred a

larger to a smaller project, the Bureau was also constrained by

reclamation law, internal regulations, and traditional practices.

Although the local agitators appear to have looked on the Bureau

as a combination of construction company and Big Brother, it could

only help them if reclamation were the principal objective.

Per-

haps even more important, benefits had to exceed costs and local

users had to show both financial capacity and willingness to repay

the capital outlay.

The high level aqueduct wanted for South

Davis simply could not satisfy any of these requirements.

Both reclamation and potential benefits could be

~btained,

in

the Bureau's plan, by inclusion of the Willard and Layton irrigation

blocks (to use the storage of Pineview and Willard Reservoirs).
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Assurance of repayment was a little harder to

arr~nge.

Althaugh

post-War prospects for urban-industrial expansion in Davis County

seemed excellent, the Bureau was taking no chances.

for a Davis irrigation aqueduct were told the hard

Supplicants

fa~ts

af reclama-

tion life--that the praject wauld have to. be much larger than they

wanted, and that municipalities wauld have to. guarantee repayment

via purchases of treated M & I water.

With assistance from prominent members af the Utah Water Users

Association, a lobby was farmed among economic growth promaters in

muni cipalities along the East Share.

These men were easily con-

vinced that an augmented water supply was absolutely critical to

economic expansion in their regian, and that the WBP

way to get it.

'.,3.S

the only

Chamber of Commerce support was the key to long-

term tawn and city agreements to purchase M & I supplies, and it

was this labby which carried the ball in winning local and con-

gressianal approval for the project.

The principal tactic, re-

flected in all the propaganda to. generate suppart for the project

and canservancy district, was nourishment of drought phobia.
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SOUTH DAVIS GROUND WATER SPOILED THE PLAN

The Bureau would not start construction until it had firm

60-year contracts for over half the M & I sales called for in the

original Definite Plan Report.

There is reason to suspect that

Bureau engineers knew something that their clients did not:

ad-

ditional sales of M & I water were jeopardized from the start by

the availability of ground water in the East Shore area.

No one

knew more about this source than the Bureau, for its own personnel

had done most of the geologic-hydrologic work for a U.S.G.S.

survey that was drawing to a close just as the WBP was getting

underway.

Not as much was known in 1950 as in 1970, but there

was more than enough information to justify concern.

Nevertheless,

it did appear at that time that ground water prospects were worst

in South Davis.

The WBWCD constructed the largest of its three

treatment plants at Bountiful, even though firm M & I contracts in

South Davis were only a small portion of the total.

This is evidence

of a confident expectation that South Davis would eventually be an

important customer, one that could be coerced by benevolent
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monopoly power.

Ironically, however, just as populat:Lon pressure

began to build, major ground water resources were diseovered.

Popu-

lation and economic growth have been dr amatic, but Bountiful City

has never increased the token M & I contract it signed in pre-con-

struction days.

The city simply drills wells and the WBWCD treat-

ment plant is little used.

FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE WBWCD

In spite of the South Davis miscalculation, the \VBWCD has not

been and likely never will be in serious finan c ial

dL~ ficul

ty.

Any financial problems belong mainly to the Bureau.

A large project like the WBP is completed in stages.

As

facilities become available, they are turned over to the Conservancy

District as a development unit.

This unit is made up of blocks in

which either irrigation or M & I water is available for distribu-

tion.

The Bureau then issues a unit notice describing the locations

and amounts of water available, the repayment assignments and 60
year (in this case) schedules.

Once the Conservancy District
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receives a unit notice, it does not immediately begin making pay-

ments for the full amount of water available.

Each block within a

given notice can have a development schedule of up to 10 years be-

fore payment must be made for the full allotment.

As each block

is sold, others are opened and the District is given separate 10
year periods to finish the selling jobs, going on this way until

the full delivery capacity of the project is sold.

The Bureau

wants to collect its money; it wants repayment to be quiet and rela-

tively painless; it does not want to bankrupt its repayment agency

or stir up resentment headlines, because such events 1Nould threaten

the future of reclamation.

By the terms of its last (most recent and possibly final) unit

notice, the WBWCD became responsible for an additional 1,000 a.f.

of M & I water and 1,500 a.f. of irrigation water each year until

the full allotment is sold.

In the case of H & I, that condition

will not be met until 1990, when

the full 50,000 a.f " projected in

the 1959 Definite Plan Report will finally come due for regular

repayment.

The final installment on the last 1,000

a " f~

of M & I
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will not be due until 2050.

When the repayment bill hits its peak,

the WBWCD will be turning over about $1.5 million per year.

the basis of sales as given in the 1974 annual
rate is about $1.1 million annually.

report ~

On

the present

Several things are working

in favor of the Bureau.

In 1970, the Bureau and the District came to an agreement to

repay $ 78 million only, because construction was hal tE!d before all
planned features had been built. 5

Irrigation sales i n North Davis

and Weber Counties are expanding via contracts with ci.ty subcon-

servancy districts.

In other parts of the Basin most new irriga-

tion contracts are f or personal, retail service direct from District

(or WBP) facilities.

These sales bring the District a much higher

price than wholesaling to irrigation companies.

By 1970, these re-

tail contracts accounted for over 1/3 of all irrigation sales, re-

fleeting the transition from farming to residential, industrial-

commercial and recreation uses, all of which are capable of paying

higher prices than farming.

Increased property valuation also

works in favor of the district, for it gets a 1 mill levy on the
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total assessed value of the real property in the district each

year.

Since 1965 that valuation increase has accotmted for an

annual increment in District reven ues of over $15,000.

MeanvJhile,

since 1970, District obligations have accumulated at the rate of

$18,750 per year (to pay for the annual increment of 1,000 a . f.
of M & I and 1,500 a.f. of irrigation water).

The increased tax

revenue is therefore virtually enough to make the additional payment,

even if the water is unsold.

Inflation alone,

throug~1

property tax revenues and higher costs of alternative

increased

~1

is probably enough to keep the District on easy stree' .

& I supplies
In addi-

tion, the agricultural payments the District is not getting from

the tm-reclaimed Willard-Layton blocks may be partially replaced by

some industrial water sales and by further allowances for non-

reimbursable recreation and wildlife benefits.

In sum, it is really the Bureau of Reclamation that is stuck

with a water inventory it could not sell, and not the WBWCD.

The

Bureau developed the water, they are financing it, and it is they

----..........~........................................................mm.....WM
. . _I. . . . . .m.. . . . . ..n.nfi~.a..........
..
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who must live with the embarrassments of redundancy, and unfa.irness in the distribution of costs and benefits. 6

CONCLUSIONS AND ULTIMATE IRONY
The lmWCD (as most Western conservancy districts ~ we believe)

is priIparily an agent for the Bureau of Reclamation, and the means

by which it assures that Western reclamation reimburses the national

treasury.

Although nominally an agent of state goverrlment, there-

fore, the WBWCD really dances to the tune of the Bureau.

Utah

practice of granting water rights to parties who can demons t rate

control of previously unappropriated water has made it possible for

a,n agency of the Federal government to effectively buy the state

resource, with inevitable consequences for the ability of State
government to manage Utah water. 7

t'

The Bureau may be s:tuck with a

slow-paying customer, but the Basin and State suffer as well.

Not all the costs of excess capacity and redundant facilities

are borne federally.

State and Basin residents will incur most of

the social costs imposed by the decision to 19nore grotll'ld water and
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build surface works.

District taxpayers and water users will be

feeling the direct effects for at least three generat :Lons. 8

Who is to blame for this situation?

shared.

We believe :It must be

Bureau planners made errors in assessing grolmd water

prospects and the economic potential of farming recla :med lands of

the lake plain.

Furthermore, these errors are hard to excuse be-

cause corrective information seems to have been available.

The

role wells had to play in the WBP supply for the Davis Aqueduct

region is evidence enough.

On the other hand, local

~nd

state

"watermen" did woo the Bureau and petition Congress to authorize

theWBP.

They were, in the first _ place, a group dedicated to

water development as the key to building paradise in the arid West.

In the second place, recent war-time experience had given them a

healthy respect for the influence of Federal spending on local

economic development.

federal spoils.

There is clear evidence that they were after

Records of their activities also suggest tha t they

paid very little attention to warning signs that were available to

them.

For example, the repayment period had to be set at 60 rather
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than at 40 years, a first for a reclamation project.

President

Truman refused to effect the enabling legislation until local in-

vestigations had forced an examination of possible consequences.

Instead of taking this respite as an opportunity for the educative

and deliberative function that is supposed to be a part of the

democratic process, the local civic leaders took it a s a challenge

and "triumphed" over the President's reservations,9 which they in-

terpreted as an adversarial tactic to keep them from getting the

federal assistance.

The ultimate irony, to us, is thus a political one.

Leading

men of Utah have long warned its residents against the blandishments

of federal involvement and easy time payments.

For the past half

century, Utahns have been continually reminded of the danger that

they may lose their life's blood through taxes, and fLlC1 their

freedom strangled in bureaucratic regulations.

They have, at the

same time, continued to be captivated by the high ideal of making

the desert bloom.

In accepting the line that "water in the life

blood of the land"lO they have swallowed the other hook.
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FOOTNOTES

1Currently there are negotiations for use o f some irrigation
water from the completed segment of the Layton Canal in the Hooper
area, but the farmers want to rent it and the WBWCD wants them to
sign long term contracts.
2Dexter C. Ellis, "Boat Pa radise at Wi llard Bay,"

Deseret

News, 9 Sept. 1975.
3Sin c e the ratio of storage to const ructe d capacity is only
1:1.2 on the Weber side, we take the liberty of

treat ~ ng

the active

storage figures not as stocks but as potential flows.
4According to W. Winegar, current manager of the WBWCD.
5This represented a reduction of $2 -3 million from the initial amount; the WBWCD has never been obligated for about $20
million of non-reimbursable costs.
60ne consequence of redundancy is that U. S. taxpayers in
general must bear the increased difference between act.ual construction and the smaller sum the WBWCD is obl.iged to pay.
7There are 13 conservancy districts in the state, covering
all the maj or watersheds; all of this is now Federal Ylater.
8Even more generations will be stuck with the high costs of
the Central Utah project which is following the same pattern,
namely:

totally ignoring a much, much cheaper ground water

alternative.
9 In the words of E. J. Fjeldsted, first Secretary-Manager of
the WBWCD, to K. Wilde in October, 1969.
10Motto of the Utah Water Users Association.

Appendix Table.

Sources (facilities) used for 1974 WBWCD water deliveries as inferred from Project
and District documents - acre feet.

Sources and Destinations

Specific Disposition

2615

M & I replacement
Weber river misc.
Ogden river misc.
Wasatch Front M & I
Roy well
Other wells (esp. in Davis Co.)
Pineview/Ogden R. (Ogden City)
Pineview/Willard canal (GSL-M&C)
Gateway tunnel (aqueducts)
Weber A. (Ogden City)
Weber A. (So. Ogden)
Weber & Davis A's. (other towns)
Irrigation, losses & spills
Causey Res. (Eden, Og. valley)
Pineview/ Willard canal (Plain City)
Pineview/Ogden R.
Ogden R. (rut. valleys)
Ogden R. (No. Ogden)
Ogden R. (So. Ogden)
Weber R. (mt. valleys)
Gateway canal (mt. valleys)
Ga.tewa.y tUlli-Lel (aqu8cJ.uctS)
Weber A. (So. Ogden)
Weber A. (Uintah bench)
Davis A. (east shore farms)
Davis A. (losses & spills)
Stream inlets
TOTALS

General Disposition

29498
149
9452
10
1314
18573
(8500)
(1300)
(8773 )
83129
5394
3568
6515
(1923 )
(3692 )
(900)
6944
1207
55289
(1170 )
(9370 )
(43149 )
(1600 )

w

m

4212
115242

115242
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ADDENDUM
Weber Basin Conservancy District
The trend in water sales continues to be "Class 0" whef'e irrigation
is concerned and toward more sales of M & I water.

Some of the latter

sales do not have very much effect on the original project design figures
because they come about through "exchanges" that can be made by utilizing
some of the unutilized Pineview or Willard water) or) can be made due to
purchase of water stock (or obtaining water stock) in existing irrigation
companies.

In the process, WBWCD is becoming more and mroe "the" water

utility in the area between North Salt Lake and Ogden.

The district is

also involved in exchanges in high valleys.
During the drought year of 1977, the District (with the encouragement of the Bureau) applied for drought relief loan(s) that financed a
link between Willard Bay (part of Layton Canal) and the Weber aquaduct.
A short length of pipeline is involved and there are plans t o put a
treatment plant at its end.

The Bureau will allow Willard water to be

treated and sold for M & I even if this action exceeds the 50,000 M & I
originally programmed in the target areas.

[The Bureau apparently is

al so not going to fight the M & I sal es of "nonproject"

watf~Y',

al though

when all the culinary sales have been made, the District will still have
as much irrigation water as it has at present.]

Some towns are still

drilling wells, while others are more competitive with the District.
Winegar wants to be able to have the water even though it would be
possible to not further service towns once the 50,000 a.f. M & I has been
reached.

Why this is so) since he complains of the extra work, is not

- - - -- - - -- -- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_____________ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,.____
. _.. _ _

~
-- I
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clear except as part of some "dream" or vis i on of the best wa.y to operate-a kingdom.

All the towns probably could go the well route even though

W.W. doesn't agree.

Speaking of wells, it is interesting to note that

the District pumped alot duri ng the drought year--but cut back to surface
water as soon as it could.

Jus t what is the balance between pumping costs

(the District can generate its own power) which reduces income from power
sales

v~ ·

treatment costs in the plants?

The District is earning or taking in muc h more money tha.n it pays
out.

In fact, the treatment plant for Willard water probab ly can be built

out of savings.

This creates a problem, however , because up until now the

interest on the excess has been used to subsidize 0 & M cos t s.

This

explains why 0 & M shares of contracts haven't risen even though 0 & M
costs certainly have (and 0 &M can be readjusted as necessary).
Dallin Jensen
The Assistant Attorney General assigned to Utah's natural resou r ces
section agrees that all the WBP "mistakes" are being repented in the CUP
case.

He also admits that some of the argument s of the water advocates

are misleading.

He had no answer when asked why persons who know better

don't speak up.

He does say that one reason why the

incong l ~uous

aspects

keep reappearing is that all the various "interests" see a particular
something in the process for themselves and are will ing to

~]O

along with

illogical arguments or features in order to secure what part s they
desire for themselves.
Jensen talks freely about the CUP subsidy of irrigation and how it i s
obtained from urban dwellers.

He is willing to discuss the notion that

urban residents lack and have lacked information about why t hey are
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necessary to the CUP equation!

He admits the groundwater a-I ternative is

cheaper as well as being certain insofar as M & I is concerned.
What is missing in the whole water debate raging over conser"vancy
districts, etc., is the flat recognition of the subsidy question.

Every-

thing flows from that need to get the locals to put up the cash as well
as the guarantee.

The irrigators will not pay for the water', they never

have paid the full price and it will become harder and harder (not easier)
to pay in the future.
C.U.P.
The truth is that much of the Wasatch Front, as we
underlain by sizable underground aquifiers.
each year.

needs for some time.

it, is

They are known to recharge

They could be made to recharge more.

doesn't need treatment.

kno~1

The water usually

The quantities are great enough to fill urban

They won't fill irrigation needs, but , at the same

time, they wont' be responsible for raising the level of the Great Salt
Lake.
[There may be a need to pump the Great Sa l t Lake if too much wa t er
is imported.]
Actually, the CUP Mon't irrigate very much.

The big effort of the

conservancy district will be to sell irr i gation to househol ders and M & I
as much as possible.

[Towns would be well advised to pump their own water

since the District will undoubtedly put i n wells sooner or later.]
What will happen, as in the WBP case, is that the CUP will be turned
into a lawn watering project.

